In some uniform price auctions, the auctioneer retains flexibility to adjust the total quantity sold after receiving the bids. Would such an auctioneer be better off committing to a fixed quantity and reserve price? Not necessarily. In the simplest possible model, this paper shows that auctioneer expected profit and social welfare are each strictly higher in all equilibria given adjustable supply than in all equilibria given any fixed quantity and reserve price. * MIT Sloan School of Management.
Following Wilson (1979) , an extensive literature explores the fact that uniform price auctions have low-price equilibria. "Even when all bidders are small relative to the market, there can be Nash equilibria of uniform price auctions in which prices remain far below the competitive price ... The issue of [such] equilibria is plainly of great practical importance" (Milgrom (2004) pp. 262, 264) . More recently, several authors have explored ways for the seller to fight back by changing the rules, notably: by committing to a supply curve that is more elastic than true supply [LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) ]; by restricting bids to a coarse set of quantities [Kremer and Nyborg (2004b) ]; by committing to an allocation rule that does not necessarily assign objects to the highest bidders [Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) , Damianov (2005) 1 ]; and by allowing the seller to adjust the quantity sold after receiving the bids, subject to a maximum constraint Q [Back and Zender (2001) 2 ]
Many real-world uniform price auctions have the feature that the auctioneer has some latitude in deciding how much to sell after receiving the bids. For example, the Treasuries in Mexico, Italy, and Finland sometimes reduce the quantity of issued bonds after the bids have been received (Umlauf (1993), Scalia (1997) , and Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2004) Back and Zender (2001) 's constraint is natural when selling physical assets that must be produced before the auction. When selling financial assets or buying physical assets, however, the 'cost of production' is typically incurred after production. For example, the cost of selling Treasury bonds is that they must be re-paid later. Similarly, the value from buying goods in a procurement auction is that they can be consumed later. In these situations, there is no upper bound on quantity at the time of auction. 3 Often only a portion of this option is exercised. For instance, when IT consulting firm Wincor This paper examines the consequences of giving the seller total latitude to increase or decrease the quantity sold after receiving the bids ('adjustable supply'). 4 This would be the case if the seller were unable to commit to any rule constraining her ability to adjust quantity. In the simplest possible setting with complete information and perfectly elastic demand, all equilibria lead to the Walrasian price and quantity. Consequently, all equilibria given adjustable supply lead to strictly greater expected profit and welfare than all equilibria given any fixed quantity and reserve price.
Model. The (female) seller has total cost C(Q) = v is commonly known to the bidders but the seller only knows its distribution. v has interval support [0, v] for some v < ∞.
5
Each bidder i simultaneously submits a non-increasing and left-continuous demand
The seller sets total quantity so as to maximize her ex post profit given the bids ('adjustable supply'). The allocation among the bidders and the price paid is then Lengwiler (1999) . 5 This simple information structure is common in the literature. See e.g. Wilson (1979) , Back and Zender (1993) , LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) , and Kremer and Nyborg (2004a, 2004b 
(Negative prices play no part in the analysis, but allowing for them eliminates some technical complications.) When it can not cause confusion, I will simply refer to the stop-out price
Otherwise excess demand is rationed pro rata at the margin.
Theorem 1. In all equilibria of the uniform price auction given adjustable supply, Pr(p = v) = 1 and Pr(Q = M C −1 (v)) = 1.
Proof. For any v, a bidding equilibrium exists: all bidders submit their true, perfectly elastic demand at price v and the seller supplies the efficient quantity. Given that others' announced demand is perfectly elastic at v, there is no way for bidder i to make positive profits whatever he bids. Thus, he is willing to announce perfectly elastic demand at v as well.
To complete the proof I need to show that, for all v, all bidding equilibria lead to price
is an equilibrium that leads to price p A , total quantity Q A , and allocation (q A 1 , ..., q A n ). 7 (Recall that v is fixed and common knowledge among the bidders but unknown to the seller.)
7 This proof also rules out mixed-strategy equilibria in which price is less than v with positive probability. In particular, let p A be the infimum of all prices that are realized in equilibrium. When suitably modified, the arguments developed here apply to this lowest realized price and hence prove that p A = v.
Part I: Price equals v. Clearly price can never exceed v in equilibrium. Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which p A < v. Several steps will lead to a contradiction. 
= ∞ for all p ≤ p Given others' bids, define bidder i's 'residual supply'
The previous step implies that q 
After this deviation, the seller will supplyS
Consequently, bidder 1 must gets
additional quantity at price p A + ε and pays an additional ε on his equilibrium quantity q A 1 . Yet, by the previous discussion, j =1 d A j is perfectly elastic to the right at price p A .
By presumption, however, M V (q
Thus, this deviation is profitable for bidder 1 for all small enough ε > 0.
Part II: The outcome is efficient, i.e.
Consider the deviation for bidder 1, as illustrated in Figure 3 :
= ∞ for all p ≤ v − ε For small enough ε, the seller's best response is to supply M C −1 (v −ε) units at price v −ε so that bidder 1 gets M C −1 (v − ε) − D(v − ε) > 0 additional units. Furthermore, bidder 1 pays a lower price than before on the rest of his quantity. Thus, this is a profitable deviation for bidder 1. Finally, p A = v and Q A > M C −1 (v) is impossible since the seller must prefer to sell less.
We have proven the desired result: in all equilibria, the outcome is always efficient and the seller always extracts all bidder surplus. 
